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Abstract
Informal jobs offer skill acquisition opportunities that may facilitate a future switch to formal employment
for young workers. In this sense, informal training on the job may be a viable alternative to formal
schooling in an economy with a large and diverse informal sector. In this paper, I investigate if these
considerations are relevant for the schooling decisions of young individuals using panel data on 17 Latin
American countries as well as micro-level data for Turkey. Specifically, I ask if the prevalence of informal
jobs distort schooling attainment. I concentrate on three measures of schooling outcomes: (1) secondary
education enrollment rate, (2) out-of-school rate for lower secondary school, and (3) tertiary education
graduation rate. I find that the secondary education enrollment rate is negatively correlated with the size
of the informal economy, while the out-of-school rate is positively correlated. This means that informal
training on the job may be crowding out school education in developing countries. The tertiary education
graduation rate, however, is positively correlated with the size of informal sector, which implies that a large
informal economy induces college attendance for those who are more likely to succeed. Policies that can
potentially affect the size of the informal sector should take into consideration these second-round effects
on aggregate schooling outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Informal jobs offer valuable opportunities for young unskilled workers in terms of skill acqui-
sition and career advancement.1 To be specific, they serve as a stepping stone to formal jobs
offering better conditions in terms of pay, insurance, job security, and conditions at work.
Although the existence of a large informal sector may distort tax collection and reduce pro-
ductivity, informal job opportunities may in fact be welfare enhancing for the young and
unskilled workers in developing countries, because these jobs help workers gain expertise and
build professional networks for improving their career prospects.
My starting point in this paper is the idea that informal job opportunities may induce young
individuals to leave the school early. In other words, existence of a large and diverse informal
sector may distort the schooling outcomes in a country. To understand the micro foundations
of this argument, think of a version of the dynamic discrete schooling choice model a la`
Heckman and Navarro (2007). Each year the student decides whether to stay at school for
another year or leave the school early and start working. To make this choice, he compares
the expected present discounted value of staying at school versus that of start working at each
decision node. For younger students, the option value of another year in school is normally
large and the value of leaving school at that age is potentially low. When there is a large
informal sector offering an alternative path to a good job, however, the expected present
discounted value of leaving school early goes up and some students may choose to dropout or
not to enroll further. In other words, informal jobs may inflate the option value of leaving the
school early and, thus, may distort aggregate schooling outcomes in an economy.2
The main goal of this paper is to test whether this conjecture is supported by data. To
achieve this goal, first, I perform a cross-country analysis using a panel of 17 Latin American
countries and, then, I analyze micro-level labor market data from Turkey. In the cross-country
analysis, I mainly estimate the sign and magnitude of the correlation between the size of the
1See, for example, Bosch and Maloney (2010), Cunningham and Salvagno (2011), and Tumen (2012).
2There is another explanation along the lines of Cunningham and Salvagno (2011). They find that formal jobs discourage
education, because once the individual enters the formal path, the probability of going back to school declines significantly. For
informal jobs, however, this is not true: the informal job is likely temporary and, so, the probability of returning to school is not
that much lowered for young individuals. In this sense, informal employment and school education are alternative to each other.
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informal sector and several aggregate schooling outcomes controlling for per capita GDP, the
level of public investment in education, the degree of income inequality as well as country and
time fixed effects. I focus on three aggregate measures of schooling outcomes: (1) secondary
education gross enrollment rate, (2) out-of-school rate for children of lower secondary school
age, and (3) tertiary education graduation rate. I show that a percentage point increase
in the size of the informal economy may lead to around 2 percentage point decline in the
secondary education enrollment rate and around 1.3 percentage point increase in the out-of-
school rate. This suggests that the size of the informal sector may be distorting schooling
outcomes. Interestingly, I find a positive correlation between the size of the informal economy
and the tertiary education graduation rates. The interpretation is as follows. The tertiary
education enrollment rates are low, on average, in Latin American countries. But, the college
graduation rates increase with the size of the informal sector, because those who enroll are
mostly the ones who are more likely to do well in college. This is the analogue of the survival
of the fittest idea in college education [see, e.g., Cameron and Heckman (1998)]. In the micro-
level analysis for Turkey, I perform the microeconometric counterparts of the cross-country
regressions. I confirm that the results obtained from the cross-country analysis are robust.
This is the first paper in the literature arguing that the availability of informal job opportu-
nities—which may lead to a potential transition to formal jobs—can diffuse into the ex ante
option value of leaving the school and, therefore, distort the schooling outcomes. This paper is
closely related to several papers in the literature. Monk, Sandefur, and Teal (2008) show using
data from Ghana that informal apprenticeship is an important institution providing training
and it is undertaken by those with junior high school or lower levels of education. They find
that for those who did apprenticeships but have no formal advanced degree, the apprentice-
ship training increases earnings by almost 50 percent. This supports my main hypothesis that
training opportunities in the informal sector may lead to an increase in the option value of
leaving the school early and, therefore, induce dropout or non-enrollment behavior. Another
closely related paper is Gunther and Launov (2012), who argue using data from Ivory Coast
that returns to schooling and experience is high for formal jobs and low for informal jobs. If
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the individual is less likely to succeed in school, then he may choose to dropout early and
start accumulating experience in the informal sector, which will potentially be rewarding in
case of a switch to formal sector. In this sense, an informal job raises the earnings potential
of those who are less likely to succeed in school and may let them choose to leave school
early. Similarly, Cano-Urbina (2014) shows using survey data from Mexico that informal jobs
generate extra value, while waiting to find a formal sector job. This also justifies the validity
of the hypothesis proposed in this paper.3
This paper is different from the others in that it investigates the role of informal job availability
on the schooling decisions of young-unskilled workers. For those who are less likely to succeed
in school, the option value of receiving an additional year of schooling may be lower than the
option value of dropping out and start working at an informal job providing skill acquisition
opportunities. Such a mechanism may distort secondary school attendance rates and the
continuation rates to college education. College graduation rates, in turn, may go up with the
size of the informal sector, because those who are more likely to succeed in college will tend
to receive education beyond high school.
Section 2 motivates the theoretical background of the paper. I demonstrate that the main
hypothesis of the paper can be placed into a version of the Ben-Porath (1967) model of life
cycle human capital accumulation and earnings. Specifically, I show that the existence of
informal job opportunities allowing workers to accumulate skills and experience may lead the
young individuals to receive less schooling. In terms of the terminology of the Ben-Porath
model, such opportunities will lead to a shorter “period of specialization.” It is worthwhile to
note that, in the Ben-Porath model, the option value of leaving the school is reflected in the
initial (after-school) human capital level (i.e., the ability to earn). Availability of informal jobs
offering skill accumulation opportunities enhances the ability to earn and induce dropping out
of school.
3The academic interest in the issue of informal employment is not specific to economists. In other disciplines—such as sociology,
psychology, and industrial relations—there are several studies that are related to the hypothesis posed in the current paper. For
example, Paternoster, Bushway, Brame, and Apel (2003) and Apel, Paternoster, Bushway, and Brame (2006) investigate whether
work intensity in formal versus informal jobs is associated with problem behavior. Zapata, Contreras, and Kruger (2011) and
Rammohan (2012) investigate the work-school tradeoff within the context of child labor. Dancer and Rammohan (2007) try to
answer the question whether maternal education has any effect on the work-school tradeoff. Amuedo-Dorantes (2004) analyzes
the poverty implications of work-school tradeoff with a particular emphasis on informal employment.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the data used, explains the
econometric methods employed, and presents a detailed discussion of the results. Section 4
concludes.
2 Theoretical Motivation
The purpose of this section is to formally establish the view that any factor—other than school
education—affecting the “earning capacity” should also diffuse into schooling decisions and
alter schooling attainment. Increased training opportunities in the informal sector may lead
to a rise in individuals’ expectations on their earnings potentials and may induce them to
leave the school early. In this sense, informal on-the-job training can crowd out formal school
education. I would like to explicitly mention at this stage that the theoretical formulation
presented in this section is just for motivation purposes and should neither be perceived as
a complete theoretical assessment of the problem nor it should be expected to map into the
empirical analyses that Section 3 presents. I start with a baseline model, which is simple
and stylistic. Then, I discuss the possibility of extending this baseline model toward several
directions.
2.1 Baseline Model
The basic theoretical framework is a version of the Ben-Porath (1967) model of life cycle human
capital accumulation and earnings. Time is continuous. Risk-neutral individuals maximize




where y(t) is the current period earnings, r > 0 is the interest rate, and T is the finite
life-length. The maximization is subject to the following law of motion for human capital:
h˙(t) = f(z, k(t), h(t))− δh(t), (2.2)
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given the initial stock of human capital h(0) = x, where the notation h˙ describes the time
derivative of the human capital stock, 0 ≤ δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of the human capital
stock, and f(z, k(t), h(t)) is the production of human capital as a function of the effectiveness
(z > 0) in the production of human capital, the fraction of time (0 ≤ k(t) ≤ 1) devoted to
human capital investment in each period, and the current stock of human capital (h(t)). I
assume that f(z, k(t), h(t)) = z [k(t)h(t)]γ, where γ > 0 is the returns to scale parameter. For
algebraic simplicity, I ignore depreciation and set δ = 0 in what follows.
The initial human capital stock (x) sets the initial conditions on the earning capacity of the
individual. It is possible to think that x is an object that the individual forms expectations




where qs is the capacity (or ability) to earn and F (qs) is the cumulative density describing the
agent’s beliefs on his earning capacity. Any factor that leads to a change in the individual’s
beliefs on his earning capacity will lead to a change in x. This will, in turn, affect the indi-
vidual’s human capital accumulation path. For example, existence of an established informal
sector that can serve as a quick and effective on-the-job training path to a formal-permanent
job may update these beliefs and may lead to an increase in x. I will come back to this point
later.
The formula for the current-period earnings is given by
y(t) = Rh(t) [1− k(t)] , (2.4)
where R is the rental rate of human capital. So, each individual splits his effort between
the human capital investment and market work. Notice that the prices, r and R, are taken
as given by the individuals. Thus, in this sense, I take a partial equilibrium stance. Next,
I solve the maximization problem of the individual. The current-value Hamiltonian can be
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constructed as
H(k, h, µ, t) = Rh(t) [1− k(t)] + µ(t)z [k(t)h(t)]γ , (2.5)
where µ(t) is the shadow value of human capital investment. The first-order condition for k(t)
is
R = γµ(t)z [k(t)h(t)]γ−1 . (2.6)
Therefore, at the equilibrium, the marginal cost of human capital investment, R, equals the
marginal return given by the right hand side of Equation (2.6). The law of motion for the
shadow value of human capital investment, µ(t), is
µ˙(t) = rµ(t)−R [1− k(t)]− γµ(t)zk(t)γh(t)γ−1, (2.7)
which yields, after combining with Equation (2.6), that
µ˙(t) = rµ(t)−R. (2.8)
Equation (2.8) is a differential equation describing the evolution of the shadow value of human
capital investment over time. The standard transversality condition,
lim
t→T
e−rtµ(t)h(t) = 0, (2.9)
has to hold, which obviously implies that µ(T ) = 0, for large T (i.e., for a long working life).







Following Brown (1976) and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), I assume that the working
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life is long, i.e., T →∞, so, at the limit,




In words, when the working life is long, the shadow value of the investment in human capital
is a constant and is given by R/r. Suppose r goes up exogenously. Then marginal cost of
human capital investment exceeds the marginal return to it. To increase marginal returns,
from Equation (2.6), investment in human capital k(t)h(t) should go down. This must be the
case since a higher interest rate means that future earnings will be discounted heavily and
therefore investment should worth less, justifying the decline in µ.
Next I derive the schooling choice in this framework. It is well known that a “period of
specialization” arises in the Ben-Porath model, if the inequality
µ(0)γzxγ−1 > R (2.12)
holds. The condition µ(t) = R/r holds for all t when T is large, so it must also hold for t = 0.
Thus, this expression becomes
γzxγ−1 > r. (2.13)
Notice that this inequality comes from the first-order condition (2.6). In other words, if the
marginal return to investing full time (i.e., k(t) = 1) in human capital exceeds the marginal
cost of it at the beginning of life, then it is optimal to set k(t) = 1 until the equality is
reached. Observe that γzxγ−1 declines over time since h(t) goes up which makes the left hand
side decline monotonically over time. To prove that h(t) goes up monotonically, one can plug













which is a positive constant. This completes the argument that h constantly increases over
time. Thus, there exists a period of specialization, the length of which is denoted with s. At
period s, the first order condition for k(s) holds with equality. I interpret the interval [0, s]
as the period of “schooling” and s as the total years of schooling. Thus, at the end of the
schooling period, by continuity, one should have
zγh(s)γ−1 = r. (2.16)
Next I derive an explicit formula for s. Observe that when k(t) = 1,
h˙(t) = zh(t)γ, (2.17)
for t ≤ s. The solution to this differential equation is
h(t) =
[
z(1− γ)t+ x1−γ]1/(1−γ) . (2.18)
Since this formula holds for 0 ≤ t ≤ s, it must hold for t = s. Solving Equation (2.16) for
h(s) and substituting it into (2.18), I get
γz
[
z(1− γ)s+ x1−γ]−1 = r. (2.19)





(1− γ)z . (2.20)
Thus, total years of schooling, s, arises in the Ben-Porath model as a function of the interest
rate (r), the degree of returns to scale in the production of human capital (γ), the ability to
earn (x), and the ability to learn (z).
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If the availability of informal jobs raises the earning potential x, then the years of schooling






In words, regardless of the magnitudes of the returns to scale and efficiency parameters, the
optimal years of schooling goes down with the earning potential that training in informal
sector would provide.
2.2 Possible Extensions
In this sub-section, I discuss the possibility of extending the baseline model, which is mostly
stylistic, toward several directions. These extensions consist of incorporating (i) income
shocks, (ii) family labor supply, (iii) two-sector labor market, and (iv) multidimensional skill
accumulation to the baseline specification. Although I do not present explicit formulations of
these extensions, I discuss in detail the potential implications and consequences of them.
2.2.1 Income shocks
The baseline model ignores the existence of both aggregate and idiosyncratic income shocks.
It is well known that income shocks affect labor demand and wages.4 Income shocks may also
have an impact on the tradeoff between schooling decisions and labor market participation
of young individuals. When a negative (positive) aggregate shock hits the economy, the
level aggregate labor demand falls (increases) and, thus, wage offers decline (rise). Since
borrowing is costly, households—especially the low-income households—may choose to cut
costs, including the schooling expenditures, which may increase the dropout rates. In addition,
to compensate for diminished labor market returns for the adult members of the households,
these dropouts might be pushed into the informal labor market.
There is also an effect operating in the opposite direction. A decline in aggregate wages
also reduces the opportunity cost of schooling, which would lead to a decline in the school
4See, e.g., Bertola (1999) for an extensive review of the literature.
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dropout rates. So, the net effect of an income shock on the tradeoff between schooling and
work is largely ambiguous. The case of idiosyncratic shocks produces less ambiguity. Since
these shocks are, by definition, idiosyncratic (i.e., independent of aggregate labor market
conditions), the change in children’s time use is more predictable if the adult members of
the household experience idiosyncratic shocks—say, an idiosyncratic job loss. Normally, the
offsetting opportunity cost effect does not exist in such a case. However, the main problem is
that idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are generally hard to distinguish empirically, especially
during recessions.
Separately, there is a large literature on the potential impact of income shocks on human
capital accumulation patterns.5 This literature suggests that the uncertain nature of future
income affects human capital investment decisions over the life cycle. These include schooling
decisions as well as post-school human capital investment decisions. Thus, the existence of
income shocks affect both the timing and type of human capital investment. It is well-known
that life-cycle models with multiple layers of uncertainty cannot be solved analytically [see
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)]. Instead, simulation methods should be used to understand
the predictions of this class of models, which is out of the scope of this paper.
Although I recognize that introducing income shocks may introduce some insights that are
not present in the baseline specifications, the nature of such an extension would be mostly
ambiguous and complicate the model in terms of analytical tractability. However, this is still
a useful thought experiment and the effect of income shocks will be discussed further in the
empirical analysis section.
2.2.2 Family labor supply
The baseline model assumes a representative-family framework; that is, the decisions are made
as if there is a benevolent family planner optimally choosing all household-level variables
including the schooling levels of the children. The representative-family framework is useful
since (i) it yields analytically tractable solutions for the family-level maximization problem and
5See, e.g., Baker (1997), Lillard and Reville (1999), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), and
Kim (2010).
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(ii) it is a good approximation for many problems studied in the family economics literature
[Becker (1993)].
However, there is also a large literature documenting the limitations of the representative-
family approach. When individual-level concerns are introduced into a family-level model, the
predictions of such a model may largely deviate from the predictions of the representative-
family model. One potential channel that would introduce individual-level conflicts is intra-
household bargaining [see, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993)]. Another is collective labor
supply [see, e.g., Chiappori (1992)].
Even in the absence of these rather complicated channels, decisions made by a household unit
will not be the same as those made by individuals. Suppose, for example, that the household
consists of two individuals: old (adult) and young (child). Suppose also that the child’s
decisions are also made by the adult. It could be possible that the size of the informal sector
in an economy affects directly the type of the jobs that the adult can have. If the earnings of
the adult member of the household are vulnerable to income shocks, then a negative income
shock may induce the adult to withdraw the child from school and push into the labor force.
Schafer (2006) documents the existence of such patterns using data from Kenya and Malawi.
When such a scenario is in effect, the size of the informal economy can potentially alter
schooling decisions not because of a change in the ability to earn but because of a negative
shock to parents’ income. However, as I explain in Section 2.2.1, the predictions of a human
capital accumulation model with income shocks will be ambiguous. The potential effects of
income shocks will be discussed in much more detail in Section 3.
2.2.3 Two-sector model
The baseline model does not explicitly model formal and informal employment separately.
Instead, it assumes that the underlying parameters for formal and informal employment are
potentially different. Making such an assumption is equivalent to assuming that the labor
market has a dual structure along the formal/informal divide. The duality argument is based
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on the view that the fundamentals driving the labor market outcomes in both markets are
substantially different and, thus, the two markets can be separately analyzed. Although the
empirical tests of the duality hypothesis yield mixed results, it is generally accepted in the
literature that the duality (or segmentation) assumption is not a bad approximation to reality.6
It is still possible to relax the segmented markets assumption and allow for employment in two
sectors as formal employment and informal employment. When these two sectors are jointly
modeled, one has to allow for unlimited transitions between formal and informal employment
along the model horizon. This means that there will two types of earnings: earnings in
formal jobs and earnings in informal jobs. It is not plausible, however, to think that formal
and informal employment are the sole labor market outcomes and workers freely travel from
formality to informality and vice versa. Unemployment should also be incorporated into such
a setup, because, for example, transitions from formal employment toward informality would
only be justified if there is unemployment in between. The ideal setup for such a model will
of course be a random search model.
In a full-fledged model, the two-sector structure will naturally arise due to the existence of
taxes and regulations in the formal sector as in Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2014). Besides
schooling and work decisions, the workers will choose a life-cycle trajectory for their sector of
employment. The economy will be exposed to search frictions and search will be allowed both
when unemployed and employed. The workers will receive competing offers from both sectors.
The steady-state worker flows in each sector will characterize the long-run equilibrium solution
for the model. Given these equilibrium worker flows, years of schooling could be solved for
using backward induction. The main problem here is that the solution for the search model
alone (without the inclusion of schooling decisions) can only be characterized using simulation
methods [see, e.g., Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2014)]. Incorporating schooling decisions along
with on-the-job human capital accumulation into such a structure will further complicate the
model and will quickly take the focus away from an intuitive basis. Although I believe that a
two-sector model can produce additional insights, it will bring enormous computational costs
6Papers including Stiglitz (1976), Dickens and Lang (1985), and Heckman and Hotz (1986) argue that the duality argument
holds, at least partially. See Magnac (1991) for an opposite view.
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that would go well beyond the objectives of this paper. It is also suspicious that the qualitative
predictions of the baseline model will be substantially altered.
2.2.4 Multidimensional skills
The baseline specification does not explicitly model skill acquisition in the informal economy.
The segmented markets assumption explained above simply presumes that the skills acquired
in an informal job is perfectly substitutable to the skills accumulated in a formal job. So,
once the individual drops out of school—say, without receiving a high school degree—to start
working as an informal worker, he will accumulate human capital on the informal job as if he
is employed in a formal job. As the degree of substitutability between skills accumulated in
formal versus informal jobs goes down, the incentives to dropout early would also go down.
In other words, if skills are multidimensional (i.e., formal and informal jobs require different
types of skills), then the strength of the baseline model’s predictions would diminish, although
the qualitative nature of the results would stand still.
In a companion paper, Tumen (2012) shows that the demand for informal jobs depends on the
degree of skill accumulation intensity offered by informal jobs. If informal jobs help workers
acquire skills, gain expertise, and build professional networks for boosting the chances to
switch to a formal job, then the option value of a job in informal sector will be high since
the probability of switch to a high-pay formal job will also be high. If, on the other hand,
informal sector does not provide satisfactory training opportunities (i.e., the skills accumulated
in informal jobs are not good substitutes with the skills accumulated in formal jobs), then
demand for informal jobs will be low. Data suggest, however, that the degree of substitutability
will likely be high in emerging economies—e.g., most of the Latin American countries, Turkey,
and some of the South East Asian countries—because informal jobs are densely located in
urban areas or regions with capital-intensive sub-sectors. If the informal jobs are heavily
concentrated in rural or agriculture-dependent areas and sub-sectors with less physical capital
requirements, then potential for advancement for an informal worker is slim [Wahba (2009)].
Next, I test the main hypothesis proposed by the baseline model first using cross-country
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panel data on selected Latin American countries and then using micro-level labor market data
from Turkey.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Cross-Country Analysis: Evidence from Latin America
3.1.1 Data
I focus on 17 Latin American countries in my cross-country empirical analysis: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.7 The
data period is from 1999 to 2007 (due to data availability concerns). I focus on the Latin
American countries for two reasons: (1) the size of the informal sector is typically large
in Latin American countries and (2) countries in the Latin American region are similar to
each other in many respects, thus, concentrating on these countries minimizes (not totally
eliminates) the need to control for the effects of regional, social, and institutional factors in
the regressions.
The empirical analysis in this study relies on different data sources. The data on the size of
the informal sector are taken directly from Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010), who
estimate the share of the informal sector in GDP for 162 countries between 1999 and 2007.
Their estimation strategy can be summarized as follows. At the first stage, they provide a list
of the main causal determinants of the size of informal sector based on the empirical results
presented in the previous literature. Broadly speaking, these factors are (1) tax and social
security contribution burdens, (2) intensity of regulations, (3) quality and quantity of public
services, (4) opportunities in the formal (or official) economy, (5) monetary indicators, and (6)
labor market indicators related to informal employment. At the second stage, they construct
indices based on model-based estimations of informal sector size, which use these causal factors
as independent variables. After appropriate normalizations, these indices are interpreted as
7I exclude Haiti for data availability reasons and Honduras for the reason that there has been a profound institutional change
(the duration of compulsory primary education is increased from 5 years to 6 years) in the sample period.
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the size of informal sector. In particular, their estimates are readily interpretable as the share
of informal economy in the GDP. Cross-country data on the size of informal sector is scarce
and this is a recent but a widely used data set in the literature.
The schooling attainment data is taken from the EdStats database of the World Bank. I
use three distinct measures of aggregate schooling achievement. The first one is the secondary
education gross enrollment rates for all programs. This indicator measures the total enrollment
in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official
secondary education age. Note that the gross enrollment rate can exceed 100 percent due to
the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance
and grade repetition. The second indicator is the out-of-school rate for children of lower
secondary school age. It refers to the number of children of official lower secondary school age
who are not enrolled in lower secondary school expressed as a percentage of the population
of official lower secondary school age. Finally, I use the tertiary education graduation rate.
This corresponds to the total number of graduates in tertiary ISCED 5A programs (i.e., college
degree) expressed as a percentage of the total population of the age where they typically finish
the most common college-equivalent program in a given country. Data on the current public
expenditure on education as percentage of gross national income are also taken from the same
database. Data on GDP per capita in current US dollars are taken from the Economic Policy
and External Debt database of the World Bank. Data on the Gini coefficient comes from the
Poverty database of the World Bank. Tables (1) and (2) summarize the means of all these
variables over the sample period.8
Data on schooling attainment indicators, public expenditures on education, and the Gini
coefficient are missing for some countries for certain time periods; but, the number of empty
cells is limited. In this sense, I deal with an unbalanced panel data, which can still produce
unbiased estimates with small efficiency losses.
8Further information can be obtained from the official EdStats documentation.
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3.1.2 Cross-country model
The empirical strategy is based on a standard panel data regression framework with country
and time fixed effects. Countries are indexed by j and time is indexed by t. The model is
simply as follows:
sjt = β0 + β1ijt + β2Gjt + β2ejt + β3gjt + νj + θt + jt, (3.1)
where sjt is the measure of aggregate schooling attainment, ijt is the share of informal sector
in GDP, Gjt is the Gini coefficient for income distribution, eit is the public expenditures on
education as a fraction of gross national income, gjt is the natural logarithms of per capita
GDP, νj is the country-level fixed effect that is potentially correlated with the observables,
θt is the time fixed effect, and jt is a random error term. The main purpose is to estimate
the sign and magnitude of β1, controlling for observed and unobserved country-level variation.
Equation (3.1) is estimated using three alternative definitions for sjt. First, secondary edu-
cation enrollment rate; second, out-of-school rate for children of lower secondary school age;
and, finally, tertiary education graduation rate.
The main idea is as follows. The size of the informal sector as a percentage of GDP proxies
the availability of job opportunities in the informal sector. The larger the informal sector is,
the greater the job options that young-unskilled workers have. In this setting, β1 measures
the extent to which the aggregate schooling outcomes may be related to the availability of
informal job opportunities—controlling for observed and unobserved variation at the country
level. Next, I report and discuss the results of the fixed-effect panel data regressions that I
perform for each of the aggregate schooling indicators I focus on, controlling for both country
and time fixed effects as well as observed variation. I cluster standard errors at the country
level and report these robust standard errors. Tables (3), (4), and (5) summarize the regression
outcomes.
In the first set of regressions [Table (3)], the dependent variable is the secondary education
gross enrollment rate. There is a clear negative correlation between the secondary school
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enrollment rates and the size of the informal sector. This result is quite robust to the inclusion
of the country-level variables for per capita GDP, Gini coefficient, and public investment on
education. Among the other control variables, per capita GDP seems to be the one with highest
predictive power, while the public investment in education with the lowest. The results state
that a percentage point increase in the size of the informal sector (as share in GDP) may lead
to approximately two percentage points decline in the secondary-school enrollment rates.
The results of the second set of regressions are provided in Table (4). The dependent variable
is the out-of-school rate for children of lower secondary school age. The regression outcomes
suggest that there is a stable positive association between the out-of-school rate and the size
of the informal sector. The coefficient of the size of informal sector is slightly above 1 (around
1.3), meaning that a percentage point increase in the size of informal sector leads to an around
1.3 percentage point increase in the out-of-school rate. Inclusion of the control variables does
not seem to improve the fit.
These two sets of regressions jointly yield the result that the availability of job opportunities
in the informal sector tend to affect the school enrollment decisions of young individuals
negatively. To be concrete, Latin American countries with larger informal sectors tend to
have lower school enrollment rates and higher out-of-school rates. An interesting side note is
that the coefficient of the school enrollment rates is larger than the out-of-school rate, which
perhaps implies that the informal job opportunities are more likely to deter enrollment rather
than to induce dropout.
The final set of regressions focuses on the tertiary education graduation rates as the dependent
variable [Table (5)]. I find a positive correlation between the size of the informal sector and
the tertiary education (i.e., college-equivalent and above) graduation rates. The fit improves
with the inclusion of the other regressors. I show that a percentage point increase in the
size of informal sector is associated with an approximately 2 percentage points increase in
the tertiary school graduation rates. At the first instance, this result sounds to be counter-
intuitive, because it suggests that college graduation tendency is higher in countries with larger
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informal sectors. However, by standard selectivity arguments, the correct interpretation is
along the lines of Cameron and Heckman (1998); that is, this result suggests that when
informal sector is large, those who are more likely to succeed in college choose to go to college.
Thus, college graduation rates tend to be higher in countries with sizable informal sectors.
These results are also consistent with the findings in the growth literature. Growth models
in the RBC tradition predict that large informal sectors are phenomena associated with de-
veloping countries, the size of the informal sector shrinks along the development path, and,
at the steady state, the informal sector vanishes [see, for example, Ihrig and Moe (2004)].
Moreover, schooling attainment also improves along the development path. The findings of
this study rationalizes this parallel movement between the size of the informal sector and
schooling achievement along the development path.
In terms of policy implications, these results suggest that any policy intervention that can
potentially affect the size of the informal sector may have large second-round (and rather
long-term) effects on aggregate schooling outcomes in a given country. Because, for example,
cutting the size of the informal sector may lead to less employment opportunities in the
informal sector and, therefore, may induce the young individuals to receive more education
at the school. The downside is that it may restrict the skill accumulation options for the
unskilled.
3.1.3 Potential Limitations
Although the results of the cross-country panel regressions tell a coherent story, the empirical
analysis has some potential limitations. First, the empirical specification given in Equation
(3.1) can only imperfectly represent the nature of income shocks that would affect the relation-
ship between school achievement and informality. The natural logarithm of per capita GDP,
country fixed effects, and time fixed effects can only partially capture the effect of income.
In particular, there is no indicator for informal income that can provide a measure of the
opportunity cost of dropping out of school.
19
Second, the cross-country regression setup may be subject to a standard self-selection criticism
in the sense that those who drop out of school for an informal job might be the ones who cannot
get a formal job. Also, those who have a college degree are the ones who are more likely to
succeed in formal jobs. This is another statement of the standard “ability bias” argument.
Although I mention that the results should be interpreted as suggestive correlations rather than
causal effects, it should be noted once again that there might be several layers of observed
and unobserved heterogeneity issues that might be driving the results of the cross-country
analysis.
Third, the share of informal employment used in Equation (3.1) is perhaps an inadequate
measure of job availability in the informal sector. The country-level differences in this variable
might reflect other institutional differences rather than informal job availability. An analysis
with micro-level data, however, would allow for region level variation in the share of informality
within the same country; thus, microeconometric analysis could provide a better environment
to capture variation in informal job availability. Finally, the variable representing public
expenditures on education (as a fraction of gross national income) might also be an imperfect
measure of school investment, because cross-country differences in education systems might
distort the link between expenditures and investment intensity. There are also other cross-
country differences in labor market institutions that cannot be captured by Equation (3.1).
Most of these potential problems can be, at least partially, remedied with micro-level data. In
the next section, I use data from Turkey—another developing country with extensive informal
employment—to test the main hypothesis of this paper. Turkey is out of the cross-country
sample; so, such an exercise would be an appropriate robustness check. Most importantly, the
Turkish data will allow us to control for factors such as regional informal wage differences,
regional unemployment differences, and unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, since I deal with
only one country, the problems related to cross-country differences that cannot be captured
by country fixed effects will not spoil the results.
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3.2 Micro-Level Analysis: Evidence from Turkey
3.2.1 Data
To test the main hypothesis of the paper with micro-level data, I use the 2012 and 2013 waves
of the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (THLFS), which is a nationally-representative
and publicly available data set. The Turkish labor force statistics are calculated from the
THLFS; so, it is a large-scale data set with extensive micro-level details on labor market
outcomes. Employed workers whose jobs are not registered with the Social Security Authority
are marked as “informal” workers in THLFS. The fraction of informally-employed workers in
the pool of employed workers is around 20 percent, which means that informality is extensive in
Turkey—albeit being slightly lower than the informal employment rates in the Latin American
countries.
For labor market income, I use the sum of monthly wage income and other non-wage monthly
earnings such as bonuses and overtime payments. I use the Consumer Price Index for 2013
(which is 7.4 percent) to deflate earnings observations in 2013—i.e., 2013 earnings are con-
verted into 2012 prices. This means that the earnings variable is defined as “real monthly
earnings.” Consistent with the official definition of the labor force, I restrict the sample to
the individuals of age 16 and above. I also restrict the sample to the individuals in the labor
force (i.e., employed workers and unemployed individuals who are actively seeking a job) to
focus on those who are attached to the labor market—thus, whose schooling decisions are
more likely to interact with labor market outcomes. I focus on four educational outcomes:
(1) no degree (ND), (2) high school dropouts (HSD), (3) high school graduates (HSG), and
(4) college graduates (COL).9 I also include other control variables such as year fixed effects,
cohort fixed effects, region fixed effects, gender, age (as a quadratic polynomial), informal
employment, and urban versus rural location. Table (6) presents the summary statistics.
There is significant region-level variation both in terms of demographic characteristics and la-
bor market outcomes in Turkey. Since there are no regional federations or states in Turkey, the
9Note that the HSG category also includes the ND category.
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formal labor market institutions are almost homogeneous across the regions—except perhaps
a few regional subsidy programs, which are rather minor.10 To control for region-level varia-
tion in earnings and unemployment rates, I construct the following region-specific variables:
regional unemployment rates, regional average informal earnings, regional average formal earn-
ings, and regional rates of informal employment. In constructing these variables, I use the most
detailed (NUTS2-level) regional classification—which divides Turkey into 26 regions—that is
available in the THLFS.
3.2.2 Microeconometric model
In this section, I test whether the predictions of the cross-country regression described in
Equation (3.1) are holds with micro-level labor market data from Turkey. In other words, I
use Turkish micro data to check if informal employment opportunities can potentially distort
schooling outcomes. The micro-level analysis improves upon the limitations of the cross-
country analysis in several ways. First, the cross-country analysis does not allow controlling
for the relative attractiveness of informal work in an appropriate way. The best way to
control for this factor is to include a measure of average informal labor earnings. Such an
extension is possible using micro-level data. Second, cross-country differences in the labor
market conditions may not be fully controlled for by including country fixed effects. With
micro-level data, regional unemployment rates and regional rates of informal employment can
do this task. Finally, cross-country institutional differences also may not be fully captured by
country fixed effects. Using micro data from a single country—preferably with country-wide
institutional homogeneity, as Turkey—will, at least partially, circumvent this problem.
To perform this task, I construct the following econometric model:
si,r,t = α0 + α1 ln(w
inf
r,t ) + α2 ln(w
for
r,t ) + α3ur,t + α4e
inf
r,t + θ
′Xi,r,t + fr,t + i,r,t, (3.2)
where i, r, and t index individuals, regions, and time periods, respectively, si,r,t is the schooling
10For example, in the United States, state-level labor market institutions, such as minimum wage laws, are different than
federal labor market institutions. Such differences do not exist in Turkey. The only remaining regional differences in Turkey
come from regional subsidies as well as differences in cultural norms. These minor differences can be more easily captured by
region-specific fixed effects.
22
outcome, winfr,t is the region-specific average informal earnings, w
for
r,t is the region-specific average
formal earnings, ur,t is the region-specific unemployment rate, e
inf
r,t is the region-specific informal
employment rate, Xi,r,t is a vector of individual level controls, fr,t = fr + ft denote region
11
and year fixed effects, and i,r,t is an error term.
As I describe in Section 3.2.1, I use four different schooling attainment variables: no degree
(ND), high school dropout (HSD), high school graduate (HSG), and college graduate (COL).
These are all constructed as separate dummy variables. ND and HSD correspond to low-
achievement outcomes, while HSG and COL can be classified as high-achievement ones. The
vector of control variables Xi,r,t include gender, cohort dummies (as 5-year age groups), age as
a quadratic polynomial, and a dummy variable describing the location of the individual along
the urban-rural divide. The coefficients α1 and α2 jointly capture the relative attractiveness
of informal versus formal labor market earnings measured in terms of the averages calculated
within local labor markets. α3 captures the state of the local labor market and α4 measures the
prevalence (or availability) of informal job opportunities in the local labor market. Although
all of the coefficients are of interest, I will focus on interpreting the sign, magnitude, and the
degree of statistical significance of α4.
Table (7) presents the estimates. The results of the micro-level analysis confirm those of
the cross-country analysis. Specifically, I find that the secondary school dropout rates (i.e.,
ND and HSD) decline with the prevalence of informal employment opportunities in the local
labor market. In particular, 1 percentage point increase in the rate of informal employment
in the region increases the probability of not receiving any school degree by 0.23 percentage
points and increases high school dropout rates by around 0.17 percentage points. The story
is reversed for the HSD categories. I find that 1 percentage point increase in the rate of
informal employment in the local labor market reduces high school graduation probability
by 0.25 percentage points. For COL (i.e., tertiary education completion) category, however,
I observe that the selectivity argument still holds; that is, the college graduation rates are
higher in regions with higher informal employment opportunities. In other words, those who
11Since the region-level average wages and employment variables are calculated with respect to the NUTS2 regional classifica-
tion, region dummy variables are included in the NUTS1 classification (a courser classification relative to NUTS2).
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are more likely to succeed in college tend to attend college in these regions. The coefficients
of the region level real earnings variables also support these results. I find that an increase in
region-level real informal earnings increases the secondary school dropout rates and reduces
the high school (and above) graduation rates. I also document that an increase in region-level
real formal earnings reduces the secondary school dropout rates and strongly increases higher
education graduation rates.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I re-estimated Equation (3.2) using the propensity
score matching (PSM) method. The PSM is performed conditioning on one percentage point
intervals on predicted school attainment probabilities. The results of the PSM regression
suggest that the qualitative nature of the estimates presented in Table (7) remains mostly
unchanged, although the magnitudes of some of the coefficients are slightly altered. This means
that the baseline results are robust with respect to the unobserved heterogeneity concerns.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes the literature by introducing the idea that availability of informal jobs
may provide an alternative skill accumulation path that might induce a tendency to leave the
school early for those who are less likely to succeed in school. After constructing a stylized
theoretical model, I test the empirical relevance of this idea in two steps. First, I use panel
data on 17 Latin American countries to estimate the sign and the magnitude of the correlation
between the size (i.e., share in GDP) of the informal economy and several school attainment
measures, controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the country level. Second,
I use micro-level data from Turkey to perform the same task.
I show that the existence of a large informal economy providing skill acquisition opportunities
for young-unskilled workers reduces the secondary education enrollment rates and increases
the out-of-school rate for children of lower secondary school age in emerging economies. I also
show that there is a positive correlation between the size of the informal economy and the
college graduation rates, which may imply that those who choose to attend college are the
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ones who are more likely to be successful in economies with larger informal sectors. The policy
implication is that any government intervention that would reduce that size of the informal
sector may lead to a greater flow into further education and may increase the average level
of schooling within the country in the long-run. But, whether this is a welfare enhancing
outcome or not is not clear ex ante, because a smaller informal sector restricts the options for
the unskilled and especially for those who are less likely to succeed in school. The costs and
returns will most likely be different for different segments of the population.
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Average Schooling Attainment by Country
Country [1] [2] [3]
Argentina 85.84 - 10.62
Bolivia 82.72 3.09 -
Brazil 105.00 - 14.44
Chile 87.14 5.54 16.08
Colombia 79.21 12.15 5.31
Costa Rica 73.38 - 25.21
Dominican Republic 66.84 11.22 -
Ecuador 61.25 23.93 -
El Salvador 58.63 18.00 8.61
Guatemala 45.79 34.44 1.61
Mexico 78.55 9.27 16.04
Nicaragua 61.55 27.66 3.03
Panama 69.16 17.36 22.89
Paraguay 64.82 13.92 6.75
Peru 86.47 2.45 -
Uruguay 101.03 10.68 7.03
Venezuela 68.97 16.41 10.19
Table 1: Indicators of Schooling Attainment (%). The first column gives the secondary education
gross enrollment rates, the second gives the out-of-school rates for children of lower secondary school age, and
the third describes tertiary graduation rates. The cells describe the average values of the respective indicators
over the sample period (1999–2007). See Section 3.1 for a detailed description of the indicators.
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Country-level Observables
Country i g e G
Argentina 25.5 8.55 4.42 50.8
Bolivia 68.1 6.95 5.48 58.8
Brazil 40.5 8.29 4.14 58.4
Chile 20.3 8.69 3.64 53.9
Colombia 41.0 7.95 3.97 58.4
Costa Rica 26.6 8.41 4.66 48.9
Dominican Republic 32.3 8.02 1.95 51.3
Ecuador 36.6 7.66 1.60 55.4
El Salvador 47.4 7.85 2.74 50.6
Guatemala 52.5 7.56 2.86 55.8
Mexico 30.2 8.84 4.88 49.2
Nicaragua 45.8 6.73 2.96 44.9
Panama 65.1 8.40 4.42 56.1
Paraguay 41.1 7.15 4.41 55.4
Peru 61.8 7.83 2.75 52.9
Uruguay 51.5 8.61 2.27 46.3
Venezuela 33.4 8.50 3.48 47.6
Table 2: Country-level Observables. The columns describe the average values of the covariates, where
the averaging is performed over the sample period (1999–2007). To summarize, i is the size of the informal
sector (% of GDP), g is the natural logarithm of the per capita GDP, e is the public expenditures on education
(share in gross national income), and G is the Gini coefficient. See Section 3.1 for a detailed description of the
variables.
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Dependent variable: Secondary Education Gross Enrollment Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Size of informal sector -1.753*** -2.214*** -2.246*** -0.866* -1.167**
(0.388) (0.407) (0.399) (0.420) (0.509)
Log per capita GDP 6.542*** 8.188*** 6.919***
(2.205) (2.262) (2.383)
Gini coefficient 0.509** 0.295
(0.208) (0.261)
Investment (% of GNI) 0.259 -0.067
(1.144) (1.148)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant term 146.283*** 114.067*** 75.343*** 118.521*** 58.926*
(15.908) (18.849) (24.313) (22.760) (31.976)
# of observations 144 144 144 78 78
Table 3: Estimation results I. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: Out-of-School Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Size of informal sector 1.066** 1.366** 1.477*** 0.929 1.343**
(0.496) (0.573) (0.498) (0.698) (0.651)
Log per capita GDP -4.579 -6.704* -7.304
(4.367) (3.893) (4.914)
Gini coefficient -0.505* -0.437
(0.256) (0.326)
Investment (% of GNI) -1.208 -0.169
(2.110) (1.730)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant term -39.481* -16.445 34.955 -25.498 36.797
(22.079) (32.584) (28.565) (33.582) (37.606)
# of observations 94 94 94 74 74
Table 4: Estimation results II. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Dependent variable: Tertiary Education Graduation Rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Size of informal sector 0.455 0.506 0.561 2.799* 1.718**
(0.649) (0.641) (0.498) (0.655) (0.811)
Log per capita GDP -4.579 -2.918 -3.767*
(4.367) (2.920) (2.086)
Gini coefficient 0.233 0.374
(0.386) (0.320)
Investment (% of GNI) -3.525 0.287
(3.076) (0.401)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant term -4.733 23.617 3.363 -65.680* -42.092
(24.397) (32.163) (46.795) (36.191) (38.313)
# of observations 89 89 89 66 66
Table 5: Estimation results III. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Means of Micro-level Covariates
ND HSD HSG COL Total
Informal worker 0.617 0.311 0.108 0.026 0.182
Male 0.630 0.794 0.765 0.619 0.738
Age 37.275 36.381 33.737 35.957 35.614
Urban 0.738 0.795 0.866 0.909 0.844
Monthly real earnings (log) 6.460 6.657 6.948 7.532 6.971
Informal monthly real earnings (log) 6.308 6.323 6.398 6.704 6.349
Formal monthly real earnings (log) 6.704 6.808 7.015 7.554 7.109
Unemployment rate 0.071 0.086 0.113 0.095 0.093
ND 1 0 0 0 0.040
HSD 0 1 0 0 0.478
HSG 0 0 1 0 0.246
COL 0 0 0 1 0.277
# of observations 7,602 91,833 47,207 53,222 192,262
Table 6: Summary Statistics – Turkish Micro Data. This table provides the sample averages of the
main variables used in micro-level analysis with Turkish data. Note that the ND category is a subset of the
HSD category.
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Dependent variable: School attainment
ND HSD HSG COL
Regional rate of informality 0.232*** 0.169*** -0.248*** 0.079***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Regional unemployment 0.239*** -0.013 0.044 -0.031
(0.026) (0.048) (0.044) (0.043)
Regional log real informal earnings 0.160*** 0.052*** -0.032* -0.020
(0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Regional log real formal earnings -0.087*** -0.407*** 0.017 0.390***
(0.011) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Male -0.026 0.131*** 0.047*** -0.177***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban -0.012*** -0.124*** 0.031*** 0.093***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age + Age2/100 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies (NUTS1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant term -0.302*** 3.433*** 0.309** -2.742***
(0.077) (0.154) (0.143) (0.141)
R2 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.12
# of observations 192,262 192,262 192,262 192,262
Table 7: Estimation results – Micro-level Analysis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% signif-
icance levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. “Male” is a dummy variable
taking 1 if male and 0 if female. “Urban” is another dummy variable taking 1 if urban and 0 if rural.
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